Housing affordability continues to dominate the headlines, but most proposed “solutions” rely on assumptions that are either unlikely or insufficient on their own.
Falling interest rates, off-site construction, government subsidies and value engineering all play a role. None of them – individually or even together – as they are currently being pursued, will move the needle enough.
Rates are unlikely to return to game-changing levels.
Off-site construction has struggled to deliver the flexibility and cost savings its proponents promise. The math simply does not support subsidizing our way out of a structural supply shortage.
And while value engineering matters – if house cost is 45% of house price and you find 5% in savings, that is real money – it is still only 2.25% of house price. Worth doing, but not game-changing.
Clearly, game-changing affordability improvements would come from significant land-use reform. But while we can advocate for that, we don’t control it (and won’t hold our breath waiting for it).
So, what can we control?
Where we are vs. where we were
To understand the answer, it helps to understand how much the market has shifted.
A couple of decades ago, public builders accounted for only about 25% of the market and were largely focused on entry-level and first move-up housing (Toll Brothers being the notable exception). Many private builders thrived by focusing on second move-up and luxury production housing – segments that, while shallower than entry-level, were still broad and deep enough to support strong businesses.
In Southern California from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s, private builders produced genuinely creative, attractive housing at a remarkable pace. Orange County was arguably the center of production housing design – Mahogany, Mayfair, Castaways – and even at higher price points, sales rates of 3–5 per month were achievable. The reason was that buyers had enough “money left over” after meeting their core needs to pay up for something truly exceptional.
All buyers carry a mental checklist: location, access, amenities, house configuration and what they can afford. Think of it as a Venn diagram — they are looking for the overlap between what they want and what they can get.
In the era I’m describing, a move-up or higher buyer with 10 items on their checklist could realistically check 8 or 9 of them.
Entry-level buyers were always stretching further, but even then the gap between aspiration and reality was narrower than it is today. When you’ve hit 8 of your 9 top priorities, you can afford to prioritize the best-looking house on the street.
But prices have risen so dramatically that the number of people who can check 8 or 9 boxes is vanishingly small. Even fairly high-salaried buyers struggle to find the house they want where they want it.
Today, most buyers are doing well to check 5 or 6 boxes.
And that changes the calculus entirely. When you’ve hit only 5 of 10 priorities and someone down the road is offering 6 checks, it is much harder to pay a premium for a better-looking house. Aesthetic differentiation loses its leverage when buyers are already stretching. The numbers tell the story plainly.
In Orange County in 1995 – the era I am describing – the median home price was roughly $208,000, while the median household income was about $49,000, yielding a ratio of approximately 4.3 times income. Today, the median OC home price is around $1.39 million, while the median household income is roughly $115,000 — a ratio of more than 12 times income.
The pool of buyers with enough financial headroom to prioritize aesthetics has not merely shrunk; it has been structurally compressed. (Sources: California Association of Realtors; U.S. Census Bureau/FRED.) It’s not a coincidence that when I visit OC today, the products feel less exciting and more efficient.
I’ve raised this point in builder presentations and often get pushback:
“Scott, we have a brand, and we can charge more for our houses.” My response is always the same: “Are you selling 1.5–2 per month while nearby competitors sell 4 or 5?”
The answer, almost invariably, is a sheepish yes. Brand and reputation matter. Design matters. But a realistic appraisal of the current market shows there are far fewer truly discretionary buyers – buyers who can and will pay a premium – than there used to be.
This point is reinforced by developments in the competitive landscape. The largest builders (publics, foreign, privates with bond financing) have grown from roughly 25% of the market to approximately 60% today. They have achieved levels of construction efficiency, cost discipline, and SG&A optimization that private builders find very difficult to match on conventional products.
If a private builder is producing homes similar to what the publics offer — perhaps slightly better-looking — but at a higher price point, they are increasingly at a structural disadvantage. Public homebuilders are offering comparable products, perhaps not as aesthetically refined, at a better price.
This is why the “we have a brand” argument is becoming harder to sustain.
The real answer: delivering utility more efficiently
So, what actually works? I believe the answer lies in a deeper understanding of buyers and a fundamentally different approach to product design – one that defines affordability not as “lowering price” in the abstract, but as delivering the same essential utility in less square footage of house and lot.
Consider the difference between a classic 4-bedroom house on a 5,000-square-foot lot and a 4-bedroom two-story house on a 3,000-square-foot lot, configured so the backyard — while smaller — still has a workable area for a dog, a patio, and a grill. Or a three-story detached in Houston on a 1400 sf lot.
The buyer’s boxes are still checked. You have met their minimums. You have not given them less of what they need; you have simply eliminated the excess they would not have prioritized anyway. That is the efficiency gain that can actually change price points.
The critical design principle here is utility per square foot, not price per square foot. Nothing extra. The bare minimum square footage and lot size that genuinely meet the buyer’s top priorities. To execute this well, you have to know precisely what those priorities are – not in general, but for a specific buyer segment, in a specific submarket, at a specific price point.
There is also an underappreciated demographic dimension to this. The industry has spent decades building for the proverbial family of four – lot sizes, bedroom counts, garage configurations, and yard expectations have all been calibrated to that buyer. But the pool of buyers has shifted.
Singles, couples, and empty nesters now make up a much larger share of buyers. For these buyers, a smaller yard is not a compromise – it may be a preference. The right-sized lot is not an inferior product; it is the right product for the household.
Why hasn’t this happened already?
This is not a radical idea – it has been successfully implemented in high-cost markets for years. California is the most prominent example, and it is instructive to understand why. California did not develop integrated land and home design out of superior insight or anything unique about its population. It was forced into it by a chronic, structural undersupply – the result of an entitlement and approval process that became progressively more restrictive earlier than in the rest of the country.
But that trend line is now spreading nationally. Atlanta was once a poster child for easy, abundant development. Yet during the pandemic boom – with roughly double the population and employment base of 1990 – Atlanta produced only about 50% more single-family units than it did at the bottom of the recession in 1990. Affordability compression is following the same trajectory. In 1990, the Atlanta metro median home price was roughly 2.5 times the median household income.
Today, that ratio has climbed to approximately 4 times income — still well below Orange County’s, but moving in the same direction and faster than incomes can keep up. Lot-to-house price ratios that were once around 20% of house prices in many growing markets are now approaching 30% and rising.
California is not an exception; it is a preview.
The structural barrier to this kind of product has been the conventional development process. In most of the country, lots are designed first, and then builders design the house to fit them. From a developer’s perspective, this makes sense — generic lots maximize the pool of potential builder buyers. But generic lots make it nearly impossible to achieve the tight integration of home and land plan that the right-sized product requires.
In California’s model and in the best examples elsewhere, the builder controls the land from the beginning and designs the home and lot plan simultaneously. The lot is designed around the house, not the other way around.
There is also a cultural barrier.
Many builders who have spent their careers serving a demographic that could check 8 or 9 boxes simply do not believe “this is what people want.” The product looks smaller, the yards look tighter, and the instinct is to assume buyers will reject it. Data from high-cost markets suggests otherwise — buyers accept and often prefer right-sized product when such floor plans genuinely meet their top priorities.
A path forward: for builders and developers
The implication for private builders is a fork in the road.
Continuing to buy previously-approved, generically-designed lots and compete directly with the public on conventional product is increasingly a losing strategy. The publics’ cost and SG&A advantages are too large. That leaves two viable paths: go very niche – ultra-high-end, slow absorption, small projects, nimble in the margins – or move upstream into land entitlement to control the product from the start.
The second path is harder, but it is where defensible competitive advantage lies, particularly for builders with deep local market knowledge.
For developers, the integrated model also offers real incentives – and it is worth noting that this is not an untested concept. The Irvine Ranch in Orange County is perhaps the most prominent example of a developer who has long controlled both land planning and product design, working with builders to create communities in which the lot and the house are conceived together from the start.
The results speak for themselves in terms of sustained value and absorption. Purpose-designed communities with right-sized product can support more segments within a single development, leading to faster absorption, quicker special tax district reimbursements, and potentially stronger overall returns. The risk of producing non-generic lots can be mitigated by partnering with builders who have skin in the game for those specific configurations. This is not a charity exercise for developers — there is a genuine return argument.
One chooses one’s risks. Continuing on the current path means selling at a pace that will never deliver strong margins once SG&A and capital costs are accounted for. Pursuing the integrated model carries its own risks – getting costs wrong for new product configurations, misjudging what buyers will accept, and execution risk in unfamiliar territory.
But this approach has been proven in high-value markets for years and is being adopted with increasing frequency in others. The risk profile is known and manageable.
Where AI changes the calculus
If the key to this approach is knowing precisely what buyers need and the exact minimum configuration that meets those needs, the hard problem is calibration. The difference between a backyard that feels workable and one that feels cramped may be a matter of a few feet and how the space is laid out.
Getting that threshold right – by market, by buyer segment, by price point – requires a level of granular, submarket-level insight that traditional market research has struggled to deliver.
The industry has made real progress here. We now have psychographic profiles and demographic tools we did not have a decade ago. But the gap between high-level buyer insights and specific product design decisions remains wide and vague. We know broadly what our buyers value – but translating that into the precise program for a specific community in a specific location during the early stages of planning is still more art than science.
This is where AI offers its greatest potential in our business – not in writing copy, responding to buyers, or improving back-office processes (though it can do all of those things), but in synthesizing the enormous volume of micro-level data about people, places, and preferences and translating it into actionable product decisions early in the planning process.
The totality of available data is overwhelming if you try to apply it manually. But pattern recognition across large, complex datasets is precisely what AI does well.
The combination of the integrated land-and-home design model with AI-assisted program development, to my mind, represents the most promising path to genuinely moving the affordability needle. Not by making houses cheaper in the abstract – but by ensuring that every square foot of house and every square foot of lot is doing real work for the buyer, and by eliminating everything that isn’t.
If we can only check 6 boxes, let’s make absolutely sure they’re the right 6.